

serious negotiations. He would probably cause this to be ascertained in the next few days, presumably by means of communicating a Note. Whether there would then be direct talks with Herr Greiser would depend on the reply by the Danzig Senate to the Note that would be communicated to them. Furthermore, Beck spoke today for the first time in a very derogatory fashion about Herr Greiser and his suitability for his responsible post. This perhaps goes to confirm the rumours that M. Beck hopes, by means of Greiser's resignation, to acquire a favourable starting-point for the report he is to deliver in Geneva.

Furthermore, I had the impression that M. Beck is at present much less concerned with clarifying the questions connected with the execution of his mandate than with managing to safeguard Polish rights by emphasizing the danger to them. This seems to be primarily a matter of certain privileges for Polish trade, but also of a general recognition and confirmation of Polish rights as a whole.

In conclusion M. Beck requested me to convey to the Reich Foreign Minister his view about the seriousness of the situation and to say that he fears reactions on German-Polish relations if it should not prove possible to stop the Danzig unilateral actions [*Sonderaktionen*]. He also asked to be informed in the event of our being able to make suggestions with regard to the choice of a new Commissioner for Danzig.

V. MOLTKE

## No. 624

2871/563570-88

### *German-Italian Protocol*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, October 23, 1936 [XIV].<sup>2</sup>

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

The German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Freiherr von Neurath, and the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Ciano, have, on October 21 and 22, 1936, in Berlin, in the names of their respective Governments, discussed current political, economic and social problems of major importance and have ascertained that their respective Governments are in agreement on the following points:

(1) The two Governments, in the negotiations for a Western Pact, will, as hitherto, proceed in the closest contact with one another.

(2) As long as Italy remains in the League of Nations, the Italian Government, in their policy within the League of Nations, will have

<sup>1</sup> The document here printed is drawn up in German and Italian, the texts arranged in parallel columns. The translation here printed is from the German text.

<sup>2</sup> The Roman numerals appear only in the Italian version.

full regard to the common interests of both countries, and for this purpose will keep in touch with the German Government. In particular also the Italian Government will in each case enter into consultation with the German Government over the question of taking part in various activities of the League of Nations (conferences, commissions etc.)

Should Italy decide to withdraw from the League of Nations, this would represent a new factor, which would be calculated to release the German Government from the offer made in this connexion in their proposals of March 7 and 31 last. In such a case, too, Germany and Italy would coordinate as far as possible their future attitude towards the League of Nations.

(3) The two Governments recognize that Communism is the greatest danger threatening the peace and the security of Europe. They confirm their intention to combat Communist propaganda with all their strength and to direct their own actions in this sense.

(4) As the Nationalists are in occupation of the greater part of Spain and as Germany and Italy have considerable economic interests there, the two Governments will recognize the Spanish National Government *de facto* as soon as possible. They will keep in touch with one another for the purpose of announcing *de jure* recognition subsequently. When they announce this, the two Governments will confirm the principle of non-intervention and respect for the integrity and territorial unity of Spain, her protectorates and her colonies.

The two Governments will jointly examine the question of when, after the *de facto* recognition, the time has come to declare the agreed arms embargo to be invalidated.

(5) The Italian Government express their satisfaction over the policy of the normalization of German-Austrian relations inaugurated by the Agreement of July 11 last between Germany and Austria. The German Government and the Italian Government are at one in their desire that this policy may continue to prove fruitful in the future.

(6) Prior to any international conference on economic and financial questions, the German and Italian Governments will come to an understanding beforehand on their attitude and will, as far as is possible, follow a joint line at these conferences.

(7) The Italian Government will give diplomatic support to Germany's efforts to obtain colonies with a view to securing a source of raw materials of her [Germany's] own.

The German and Italian Governments will, apart from the question of colonies, strive in common endeavour to facilitate the supply of raw materials for both countries.

(8) The German and Italian Governments will keep each other currently informed of the basic principles governing their commercial policies in the Danubian region.

Whilst the two Governments recognize the value of such cooperation, they reserve the right to have its nature and extent studied and fixed by their respective technical bodies.

The two Governments confirm their opposition, in future too, towards all endeavours to set up in the Danubian region, without the simultaneous participation of Germany and Italy, new economic organizations such as, for example, economic integration [*Zusammenschluss*] of the Little Entente, or an economic integration in the sense of the Tardieu Plan.

(9) On the occasion of the German recognition of the incorporation of Abyssinia, the Italian Government declare that they agree to the German-Italian Commercial Treaty of October 31, 1925, and the German-Italian Clearing Agreement of September 26, 1934, together with the supplementary agreements subsequently concluded, being extended to the Italian colonies and possessions, including Abyssinia. In addition, there will be concluded in respect of the colonies and possessions, including Abyssinia, appropriate agreements, such as are contained, in respect of commercial relations with the Kingdom of Italy, in the German-Italian Agreement of April 16, 1935, on the exchange of goods together with the supplementary agreements thereto.

The Italian Government will as far as possible promote the endeavours of German trade and industry to take part in the economic exploitation of Abyssinia.

The Italian Government declare that they are prepared to enter at once into conversations on the treatment of concessions legally acquired before October 3, 1935, by German Reich nationals in Abyssinia, and to conduct these conversations in a most benevolent and friendly spirit.

With regard to any concessions granted subsequently, the Italian Government reserve their views on each individual case.

The treaties and agreements necessary for the implementation of the points enumerated above shall be concluded as soon as possible. The negotiations thereon shall be entrusted to the German and Italian Government Committees for the settlement of German-Italian economic relations; these Committees shall hold their next joint session as soon as possible.

Done in two copies, each text being equally authentic.

C. VON NEURATH

G. CIANO

[EDITORS' NOTE: On October 23, 1936, a German-Japanese Agreement against the Communist International (the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact) and supplementary secret agreements were initialled in Berlin by Ribbentrop and the Japanese Ambassador, Mushakoji,

and an exchange of Notes (see document No. 625) took place. The signature of these Agreements was performed in Berlin on November 25, 1936, by Ribbentrop and Mushakoji (for which event and the full texts, see volume VI of this Series). The Agreements, which came into force immediately upon signature, comprised:

(i) An Agreement against the Communist International with Supplementary Protocol (this Agreement and Protocol were made public at the time of signature: see *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1937, Pt. II, pp. 28-30; English translation in *Documents on International Affairs, 1936*, pp. 297-99.).

(ii) A Secret Supplementary Agreement to the Agreement against the Communist International (text printed in Series D, volume I, footnote 2a to document No. 463, on p. 734).

(iii) An exchange of Notes between Mushakoji and Ribbentrop (2871/564571-72), attached to the Secret Supplementary Agreement as Annexes I and II. In his Note, Mushakoji stated that both Governments were agreed that: "the 'political treaties' referred to in Article II of the aforementioned Secret Supplementary Agreement do not include either fishery treaties, or treaties concerning concessions, or treaties concerning frontier questions, between Japan, Manchukuo, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the like, which may be concluded between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." In his reply, Ribbentrop confirmed this interpretation.

(iv) An exchange of Notes between Ribbentrop and Mushakoji (2871/564573-74), attached to the Secret Supplementary Agreement as Annexes III and IV. In his Note, Ribbentrop stated that "the German Government do not regard the provisions of the existing political treaties between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, such as the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 and the Treaty of Neutrality of 1926, in so far as they have not become null and void under the conditions existing at the time this Agreement comes into force, as being in contradiction to the spirit of this Agreement and the obligations arising from it". In his reply, Mushakoji stated that his Government took note with sincere satisfaction of this communication (see also document No. 625).

(v) An Agreement that the Secret Supplementary Agreement, together with Annexes I-IV, should be kept secret and might only by mutual consent be revealed to third parties (2871/564578).

Little evidence as to the negotiations preceding the initialling of these Agreements has been found in the German Foreign Ministry archives (see volume IV of this Series, Editors' Note, p. 948 and the present volume, documents Nos. 197, 362 and 509). According to the records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East it appears that in April, 1936, the Japanese Ambassador, Mushakoji, returned to Berlin from long leave. On May 8, he was instructed that Japan considered it

proper to "make a vague engagement without limiting the matter" and to investigate "the limit and substance" of the German proposals, "keeping closely in touch with the leading figures" of the German Foreign Ministry and the Nazi Party. Prolonged negotiations with Ribbentrop followed. (See *Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East*, Exhibit 2614, Arita to Mushakoji of May 8, 1936, and Exhibit 484, Report of the Investigation Committee to the Japanese Privy Council, November 20, 1936.)]

## No. 625

2871/564575-77

*German-Japanese Exchange of Notes on the occasion of the Initialling of the Agreement Against the Communist International*

(i)

*The Japanese Ambassador in Germany to Ambassador von Ribbentrop*

BERLIN, October 23, 1936.

MR. AMBASSADOR: I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have today, together with a telegram informing him that the initialling was performed this day, sent the enclosed telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Arita.

At the same time, I take the opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest esteem.

MUSHAKOJI

[Enclosure]

The Ambassador in Berlin Count Mushakoji to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Arita

BERLIN, October 23, 1936.

With reference to the Annexes III and IV<sup>1</sup> of the Secret Supplementary Agreement to the Agreement Against the Communist International, I have, on the basis of my negotiations with Ambassador von Ribbentrop, the firm conviction that the spirit of the above-mentioned Secret Agreement is alone decisive for the future policy of Germany towards the USSR.

I have shown Ambassador von Ribbentrop this telegram and received his agreement.

MUSHAKOJI

<sup>1</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 1138.